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How Plato overcame the cosmopolitans
Detlef von Daniels
It's just a jump to the left/ And then a step to the right …
With a bit of a mind flip/ You're there in the time slip
And nothing can ever be the same

Introduction
At the beginning of his lectures on the history of philosophy Hegel notes how strange it is that
philosophy, unlike other scientific disciplines, has a history that has an immediate presence in
systematic thought. To Hegel philosophy was a discipline whose progress could not be matched
straightforwardly to a time line and whose knowledge could not be easily accumulated in
condensed form. At the very least, he regarded philosophy as a discipline where narratives of
accumulated progress are always challenged by new readings of the tradition. From the
perspective of contemporary political philosophy, Hegel's dictum may seem outdated. Not only
would it seem possible to tell the story of steady progress in contemporary political philosophy
starting – inevitably – with the publication of the Theory of Justice and culminating in current
avant-garde discussions on global justice and human rights.1 Even further, the history of political
philosophy appears to be reduced to mere history as is only serves to illuminate certain aspects of
the liberal tradition2 or to accumulate our positive knowledge of past times or other traditions.3
1

This optimistic narrative does not refer exclusively to the normative thesis of Francis Fukuyama but is meant as a
sociological observation. It underlies countless syllabi on the history of political philosophy and writings about
liberalism. I have yet to see a syllabus where the history of liberalism is presented – in the fashion of the cultural
pessimists of the 1920s – as a history of decay. Kant was well aware that history could always be written either as a
history of progress, or of decay, or of ever changing fate. His philosophical history is written in the practical interests
of reason, not to better the world but to avoid misology – despair of reason.
2
Even the Cambridge School, distinguished by its historical awareness, concentrates exclusively on the liberal or
republican tradition in the Anglophone world. In an ironic twist Quentin Skinner was appointed by Royal warrant to
the Regius Chair of Modern History; consequently, republicanism is not the only political tradition that exists in
Great Britain; and, of course, there are other countries where liberalism is not a part of modern history or a relatively
newcomer when compared to the Anglophone world.
3
Studies about political thinking that is not part of the liberal philosophical tradition, e.g. reforms by enlightened
monarchs such as Frederick II or Joseph II, tend to be written by historians rather than philosophers, even though
enlightened monarchs, e.g. Abdullah II of Jordan, still make an impact today.

2

This rough and ready assessment is confirmed if we look at current discussions on liberal
cosmopolitanism.4 These discussions pay little attention to the history of philosophy.5 If history is
presented at all, it is only for pedagogic reasons in the form of the pre-history of current ideas,
not unlike the practice in the history of the sciences, and not as a challenge or counterpart to
them.6 Liberal cosmopolitanism typically presents two reasons for rendering philosophy the way.
First, the real impact of globalization only occurred in the final years of the 20th century, thus, the
world

to

which

philosophy

responded

has

changed

dramatically.7

Second,

liberal

cosmopolitanism is modest in its aims and therefore receptive to many traditions, not only the
established traditions of 'Western' philosophy but also religious, non-Western, and even
metaphysical traditions.8 In response to the charge that despite its pretensions to hold true across
all cultures and philosophical traditions, liberal cosmopolitanism is ultimately based on a thin
textual corpus consisting mostly of the Anglo-American liberal tradition, advocates of liberal
cosmopolitanism respond by arguing that all other traditions are at least potentially integrable –
of course only as long as they are 'reasonable.' In this way liberal cosmopolitanism appears to be
always one step ahead of any criticism, a step ahead of historical assessments, since it is directed
towards the future, a step ahead of 'realist' challenges since it is ideal, and a step ahead of
'metaphysical' criticism since it is pragmatic, and thus non-metaphysical.
However, despite such self-assuredness, a certain measure of uneasiness remains, the kind of
uneasiness that may even be a sign of philosophical worry. I would like to articulate this worry
by reflecting the current state of affairs in ancient times. My thesis is that the beginning of
philosophy was marked by very similar pragmatic cosmopolitan sentiments, and that Plato while
establishing philosophy as a specific kind of inquiry, became, in effect, the first anti4

The most important protagonists in the debate are Charles Beitz, Simon Caney, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge,
and Peter Singer, all of whom promote some version of cosmopolitanism or global justice. David Miller, Thomas
Nagel, and John Rawls are liberals, although skeptics about the feasibility or desirability of global institutions.
5
None of the authors mentioned above explicitly reflects on the question why cosmopolitanism is more convincing
now than when it was first formulated in theory (e.g. in Kant) or first found practical support (after 1918).
6
See for instance the entry on global justice in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Pauline Kleingeld and Eric
Brown, "Cosmopolitanism," The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/cosmopolitanism/, last modified November 28, 2006.
7
This narrative of globalization is most explicit in Peter Singer, One World. The Ethics of Globalization (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 1-14. It should be noted that the narrative of globalization has been challenged
by economists and historians.
8
Simon Caney states that principles of cosmopolitanism are affirmed in a kind of overlapping consensus by many
philosophical and religious traditions. See Simon Caney, Justice Beyond Borders. A Political Theory (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2005), 4. However the overlapping consensus does not bind people who stress different
aspects of a tradition. To claim that all Jews are bound to and can be judged by specific secular political principles
because "their tradition" affirms them would not persuade everybody.
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cosmopolitan philosopher. However, I will argue that Plato does not just present an 'anticosmopolitan argument' to weigh the pros and cons of cosmopolitanism but instead, through his
dialogues, demonstrates that this kind of debate– though a necessary beginning – is insufficient
('sophistic') and must be overcome.
I will first show that the current discourse on cosmopolitanism relies on three premises that it
takes for granted. I will then argue that very similar ideas can be found in writings of the sophists,
a movement that has effectively been silenced by Plato. The challenge I intend to present in this
way is that we may see our contemporary leanings reflected in ancient times, however with the
front lines reversed, with the side of the 'unphilosophical' sophists having the upper hand. Finally,
I will also examine the limitations of Plato's 'anti-cosmopolitan' position. Whether this reflection
is still within the tolerable realm of the 'reasonable' is to be seen. My hope is that a more
profound understanding of by examining our entire history will open up ways to a better
understanding of others.9
I. Since my thesis is that contemporary cosmopolitanism can be reflected in ancient times, it is
necessary to briefly characterize it. Cosmopolitanism refers to all those liberal political theories
that were developed or became prominent in the last decades of the 20th century that apply on a
global scale principles and ideas previously developed for national societies. The most prominent
theories are various Rawlsian schemes of global justice; however, utilitarian theories and theories
that contain a mixture of various strands also belong to this class. Since the definition carries a
time stamp, it would exclude classical authors like Kant (i.e. his whole philosophy ranging from
his theoretical philosophy to the philosophy of religion), but include theories inspired by Kant
that defend a specifically contemporary interpretation of Kant's cosmopolitanism.10
One may question this definition as too general and too broad; too general, since all liberal
political theories apply some principles on a global scale, and too broad, since it includes too
many different theories, arguably even some theories that consider themselves to be explicitly
anti-cosmopolitan. It might thus appear that the definition delineates not cosmopolitanism but
9

Karl Jaspers’ observation of similar developments in different cultures during the axial age (roughly the 8th to the
2nd century BC) may serve as a common point of reference for an intercultural dialogue. See, for various approaches
to this question, The Axial Age and Its Consequences, ed. Robert Bellah and Hans Joas (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 2012).
10
Pogge explicitly reinterprets Kant’s theory in the framework of Rawlsian theory as being political but not
metaphysical. Thomas Pogge, "Is Kant's Rechtslehre Comprehensive?" Southern Journal of Philosophy 36 (1998):
161-187.
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contemporary political philosophy in general. However, we should recall two aspects. First, the
extension of moral and political principles on a global scale under the heading of
cosmopolitanism is, indeed, a recent phenomenon of the post-Cold War era. The 1964 edition of
the Encyclopaedia Britannica does not even have an entry on "Cosmopolitanism" and under
"International Relations" only refers to related articles on Empire, Hegemony, Imperialism,
Mandate, Protectorate, Spheres of Influence, and Suzerainty.11 In official Marxist terminology,
on the other hand, "cosmopolitanism" was regarded as a camouflage strategy on the part of US
imperialism.12 Therefore, left-leaning political theories that kept an eye on official Marxism, such
as the Frankfurt School in Germany, did not pursue this line of thought before 1989.13 It is easy
to imagine the kinds of criticism Rawls' distinction between liberal, decent, and outlaw regimes
(under the presumption that they all must yield to a liberal notion of human rights) would have
provoked under Cold War premises.
Second, the history of liberal political philosophy with its current spearhead in cosmopolitanism
should not be taken to represent philosophy as a whole. Even among liberal-minded thinkers and
in a liberal culture the very idea of cosmopolitanism was received ambivalently in the 19th and
20th century, or even regarded as irrelevant.14 Moreover, realist theories in international relations,
inspired by Schmittian thinking through Hans Morgenthau, and deconstructivist theories that take
their lead (also unacknowledged) from Heidegger, pursue lines of thought that cannot easily be
subsumed under contemporary cosmopolitan. And so, it is, indeed the first characteristic of
contemporary cosmopolitanism that it presumes that a basic cosmopolitan outlook or some
cosmopolitan pretensions is an integral part of contemporary political theory. This may be
labeled "historicism," taking for granted a Whig narrative of liberalism, while leaving out a
reflection on the conditions of its own tradition, and failing to even include other traditions in its
considerations.15 This first characteristic of contemporary cosmopolitanism is external or
sociological. From an internal point of view, this first characteristic might be considered to be
11

Previous editions had a short entry on stoic cosmopolitanism but not on Kant, let alone the cultural
cosmopolitanism of German Romanticism.
12
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia recounts the history of cosmopolitanism beginning with the stoics, including the
teachings of the Catholic Church, and continuing all the way to German idealism and explains: "Cosmopolitanism is
an inseparable part of the ideology of imperialism, such as in bourgeois political science. …. Proletarian
internationalism is opposed to bourgeois cosmopolitanism." Great Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. 13, transl. of the third
edition (New York: Macmillan, 1973), 190.
13
See Sigrid Thielking, Weltbürgertum. Kosmopolitische Ideen in Literatur und politischer Publizistik seit dem
achtzehnten Jahrhundert (München: Fink, 2000), 242-251.
14
For a historical account of the various facets of cosmopolitan discourses see Thielking, Weltbürgertum.
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misguided or irrelevant. Instead, different features will be named as decisive elements of
cosmopolitanism. Thomas Pogge writes:16
Three elements are shared by all cosmopolitan positions: First, individualism: the
ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines,
tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states. The latter may be
units of concern only indirectly, in virtue of their individual members or citizens.
Second, universality: the status of ultimate unit of concern attaches to every living
human being equally – not merely to some subset, such as men, aristocrats, Aryans,
whites, or Muslims. Third, generality: this special status has global force. Persons are
ultimate units of concern for everyone – not only for their compatriots, fellow
religionists, or such like.

Similar characterizations can also be found in other authors.17 At this point it would be possible
to further differentiate between different strands of cosmopolitanism within the contemporary
debate, distinguishing, for example, between moral, legal, cultural and political or institutional
cosmopolitanism, according to how much power and which kind of institutions are theoretically
assigned to the global level. Expanding on various modalities of cosmopolitanism would be
helpful for answering specific criticisms such as neglecting the importance of national identities
or overestimating the transformative power of administrations with regard to economic of
cultural forces. It would also allow a rough differentiation between strong and weak
cosmopolitan approaches in political theory, for example, grouping Pogge, Nussbaum, and Singer
on one side, and Nagel, Miller and Rawls on the other side.
However, these distinctions would cloud a second premise that is taken for granted by all
cosmopolitan approaches; they are all egalitarian theories. Once again, this may sound little
surprising, since we are told that "every plausible political theory has the same ultimate source,
which is equality."18 Yet, when reflecting on the premise of equality by imagining alternative
historical positions, it becomes obvious that the premise is specific to contemporary
15

This point has also been marked by Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the Deed. Realism and Moralism in
Political Argument, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005), 22-24.
16
Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," Ethics 103 (1992): 48-49.
17
See Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 3-5.
18
Will Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy. An Introduction (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 4-5.
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cosmopolitanism. In contemporary discourse, the value of equality is usually taken as a given,19 a
"rock-bottom ethical premiss … [that] cannot be derived from anything else"20 or a human end
that "cannot be defended or justified, for it is itself which justifies other acts."21 As long as the
aim is to defend a certain conception of equality within a society that considers itself to be liberal,
the more interesting debate is, indeed, explicating what it means to treat citizens as equals (the
'equality of what?' question). However, in cosmopolitan debates egalitarianism becomes a more
prominent premise since cosmopolitan theories aim not only to be acceptable by liberal societies
but also by others, by decent societies22 or by collectivistic moralities.23 The fundamental
problem of contractarian approaches is that the "international contracts" only include liberal
peoples and decent non-liberal peoples. This strategy presupposes that certain regimes are
illegitimate, even though this is precisely the question that is at stake. Relying on the notion of
reasonableness is no way out of the quandary, as long as reasonableness is defined in terms of
what people (who are taken to be free and equal) would consent to. Yet, my point here is not to
criticize egalitarian approaches but to draw attention to a characteristic premise of
cosmopolitanism.
However, there may be a reason that this premise cannot be or need not be explicitly defended,
which leads us to the third characteristic of contemporary cosmopolitanism. One might think that
all non-egalitarian theories depend on some 'metaphysical views' that cannot be defended within
the limits of a 'reasonable empiricism'. Pogge alludes to this argument by suggesting that all
approaches that do not share the values of cosmopolitanism must presume a 'metaphysical' view
of arbitrary differences such as between men and women, commoners and aristocrats, blacks and
whites, compatriots and others, etc.24 Contemporary cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, is
characterized by taking a strictly non-metaphysical attitude. This attitude may be defended in a
variety of ways, either as a requirement of reasonableness within political theories or as an
19

With regard to the question of how to justify equality in human rights, the same observation has been made by
Allen Buchanan, "Equality and Human Rights," Philosophy, Politics, and Economics 4 (2005): 69-70. On the
'groundlessness' of egalitarian theories in various authors see John Kekes, "A Reasonable Alternative to
Egalitarianism," Contemporary Debates in Political Philosophy, ed. Thomas Christiano and John Christman
(Oxford: Blackwell), 179-194. Kekes however uses his observation to serve a one sided political agenda.
20
Brian Barry, "Equality," in Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker, eds., Encyclopedia of Ethics (New York:
Garland, 1992), 324.
21
Isaiah Berlin, "Equality," in Concepts and Categories, ed. Henry Hardy (London: Hogarth Press, 1978), 102.
22
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples with „The Idea of Public Reason Revisited" (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1999), 59-62.
23
Allen Buchanan shows against Rawls that human rights are acceptable by collectivistic moralities. See The Ethical
Pluralist Challenge to Human Rights, manuscript 2012.
24
Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty," 48.
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(empirical) result derived from human experience.25 In any case, the theory is presented as being
based on very lean, easily acceptable premises, for which 'non-metaphysical' may be the label.
Taken

together,

these

three

premises

are

sufficient

to

characterize

contemporary

cosmopolitanism. Given certain historical and philosophical narratives about our time, faith in
egalitarianism and an anti-metaphysical attitude, cosmopolitanism appears to the logical
consequence of political thinking. The definition is broad as it is meant to capture both sides of a
particular debate. Thus, Nagel, Rawls and Miler would not dispute the fact that cosmopolitan
developments are in the line of contemporary political theory but would only question certain
normative claims. One might be concerned that it is not possible to arrive at interesting insights
by reflecting on such very general characteristics, but instead, only by engaging in this debate and
promoting some aspect of global justice or instead, taking a historical point of view by
discovering some antecedents of this noble aim. However, I will try to show how it is possible to
reformulate the terms of this debate so that it appears in a different light.
II. At the beginning I claimed that historical reflection may not only provide more details but may
also serve to call our certainties into question. However, the official genealogy of
cosmopolitanism does not offer any revealing insights. When looking at the first mention of the
word cosmopolitanism, one is informed that it was coined by Diogenes26 while the first full
fledged theory was arguably formed in the third century B.C. by Chrysippus.27 He might have
been a pupil of Diogenes, who elaborated the frugal, kynic28 side of Socrates' life and teachings.
Thus, there is a direct line from Socrates and the early sophists to cosmopolitan theory.
Chrysippus holds that all people on the earth share a common humanity and that the wise man is
not a citizen of a particular polis but of the earth. Therefore he should show "cosmopolitan
concern" to others and work to benefit human beings as such as far as circumstances allow.
Details of this account, particularly the ascription of these views to Chrysippus or earlier authors
25

Martha Nussbaum claims that her account of human capabilities "is articulated in terms of freestanding ethical
ideas only, without reliance on metaphysical and epistemological doctrines." Frontiers of Justice. Disability,
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 2006), 163.
26
Diogenis Laertii, Vitae philosophorum, vol.1, ed. Miroslav Marcovich (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1999-2002), VI 63.
27
Stoicorum veterum fragmenta vol. 2, ed. Hans von Arnim (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1964) II 32; 328.
28
I use the spelling kynic instead of cynic to indicate that Chrysippus and Diogenes challenged the Athenians not
with materialistic explanations of normative vocabulary in the way that the modern word ‘cynic’ might suggest, but
rather by showing ostentatious contempt for ease and pleasure.
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are a matter of historical dispute, since we mostly know about them from later Stoic
reconstructions.29
From the perspective of contemporary cosmopolitanism, ancient cosmopolitanism may be
patronized as being informative but as philosophically deficient, since it fails to fully spell out
principles and arguments, and particularly to reflect on institutional requirements. Moreover the
stoics can be accused of favoring a quietist attitude towards injustice, failing to develop
fundamental political alternatives to existing imperial regimes, and especially for being silent
about the most unjust institution of the ancient world, namely slavery.30 Thus, even though
contemporary cosmopolitanism may readily grant the influence of ancient cosmopolitanism on
later doctrines, its fundamentally anti-historic attitude is confirmed by this reading. History of
philosophy is mere history, since earlier views (being silent about slavery) cannot stand up to
later insights.
III. However, there is another way to read the ancients that allows them to become directly
relevant to us. I will argue that Plato was the first anti-cosmopolitan philosopher, who reacted
against cosmopolitan philosophers of his time. This may seem like an impossible claim, given the
historical account just presented. How can Plato react to cosmopolitan theory if it only evolved
100 years after his death? Eric Brown writes apodictically that there is no reliable evidence for
programmatic cosmopolitan claims before the early stoics.31 He specifically rejects the idea that
Alexander the Great was driven by a cosmopolitan impulse.32 It is a truism that Alexander’s
campaign dramatically changed the fact of the ancient world, not only in terms of political
change but also in the how people thought about politics. After Alexander it was possible to
imagine a Hellenic empire ruling the whole world, something that was previously unimaginable.
Yet, Alexander's campaign not only brought about the age of Hellenism but at the same time
destroyed something else, namely a different image of cosmopolitanism, an image of a peaceful
29

I am following Eric Brown's account, in Stoic Cosmopolitanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
forthcoming). A short version has been published in German, "Die Erfindung kosmopolitaner Politik durch die
Stoiker," Kosmopolitanismus. Zur Geschichte und Zukunft eines umstrittenen Ideals, ed. Matthias Lutz-Bachmann,
et. al. (Weilersvist: Velbrück 2010), 9-24.
30
For the criticism see Martha Nussbaum, "Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism," The Journal of Political Philosophy 5
(1997): 8, 14.
31
Eric Brown, "Die Erfindung kosmopolitaner Politik," 23.
32
This claim has been advanced by W. W. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," Proceedings of
the British Academy 19 (1933), 123-166. For a comprehensive critique see Ernst Badian, "Alexander the Great and
the Unity of Mankind," Historia 7 (1958): 425-444.
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confederation of free and autarchic33 cities. In the 4th century and thus at the time when Plato
wrote his major works, this image was the real alternative, situated between the outdated ideal of
a small and autarchic polis and the Persian model of a more comprehensive empire.34
Elements that contributed to this form of Panhellenic cosmopolitanism can be found particularly
in the writings of two authors, Isocrates and Xenophon.35 Both men were famous contemporaries
of Plato and presented thoughts that were prominent at this time. However neither of them
presented a complete theory of cosmopolitanism comparable to modern day theories. Yet, if we
combine elements from both writers together with other ideas around at this time, we can
conjecture that such a theory or such thoughts were possible, or, so to speak, in the air. Thus, I
read Isocrates and Xenophon not strictly philologically as sources but ask what kind of
philosophical theory one could assemble from their thoughts and those of other of their
contemporaries. In particular, I want to make plausible that Panhellenism is not necessarily a
proto-nationalistic idea erected to oppose the 'inferior race of barbarians, but instead can truly be
interpreted as having been inspired by cosmopolitan considerations.
In the early 4th century, Isocrates was the head of the most famous school in Athens36 and an
ardent promoter of Panhellenic cosmopolitanism.37 In his speeches he clearly analyses the perils
the Greek world faced in the fourth century. After its victory in the Peloponnesian war Sparta
could not establish a position of permanent supremacy but became despised as a tyrannical city
due to its harsh treatment of defeated enemies. Athens had earlier lost its reputation as a defender
of Greek freedom and its numerous hostile expeditions in best imperialistic fashion did little to
33

It is a commonplace that the freedom of the ancients is not the same as modern freedom. However the same
applies to the notion of autonomy. Actually the ancient catchphrase was not autonomía but autárkeia. As this idea
channels our thinking in a specific way I will from time to time use the phrase "free and autarchic city." See Mogens
Herman Hansen, "The Autonomous City State. Ancient Fact or modern Fiction?" in Mogens Herman Hansen and
Kurt Raaflaub, Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1995), 21-43.
34
These were the only alternatives at this time. The Roman solution to combine city state structure with imperial
form of governance was developed only later.
35
Popper states that among the philosophers Antisthenes was Plato's most prominent opponent. Karl Popper, The
Open Society and its Enemies, 2nd. ed. (reprinted London: Routledge, 1995), 153. Popper relies on 19th and early 20th
century German scholarship that discovered implicit references to Antisthenes throughout Plato's texts. However
these attributions are mostly conjectural as hardly any actual writings by Antisthenes are known. Therefore, I will not
try to reconstruct his position.
36
Isocrates claims to have had "more pupils than all the rest together who are occupied with philosophy." Antidosis,
41. All quotations are from the Loeb Classical Library edition, Isocrates, transl. and ed. by G. Norlin, 2 vols.
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928). Plato's academy on the other hand had a rather shaky beginning. The
ridicule by Gorgias "the philosopher talks in a whisper with three or four pupils" (Gorgias 485d) can be read as a
description of the early days of the academy.
37
For the following see especially his speech On the Peace. Aristotle rendered it in his Rhetoric III, 17 under the title
On the Confederacy. Isocrates has changed his view according to historical circumstances. However my main point
is not to pinpoint a specific view to a specific date but to show what kind of theory Plato was opposed to.
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restore it. Meanwhile, other cities tried to step in whenever a power vacuum emerged, and no
power was ashamed to accept help from the Persian king or to employ mercenary forces.
Constant civil strife, often fueled by third-party interests, and countless wars between cities and
coalitions threatened to destroy the prosperity, peace and culture of the Greek commonwealth. As
an alternative Isocrates proposed to form a confederation of free and autarchic cities, a
brotherhood of culture, transcending the bonds of race.38 He argued that peace not only among
Greeks but with all of mankind would be the precondition for striving for true aims, namely being
respected by others and raising the standards of living for all.39 He criticizes realist principles of
power politics as unjust and serving only short-term interests.40 In the long run it would be in
everyone's interest to uphold peace, end the suffering among Hellenic people and support
burdened societies, i.e. refugees from destroyed cities.41 Insisting that these principles are in
"everyone's interest" is for Isocrates not just a façon de parler but is specifically addressed at
Athens, a relatively strong player. Isocrates also criticizes the common enemies of mankind.
These are the mercenaries who commit atrocities that make peace impossible.42 Thus, simple,
solid political judgment based on a fair assessment of effects should convince Athenians and
everyone else to pursue this worthy cause.43 It is noteworthy that Isocrates was not just a lofty
theoretician or a soapbox orator but a highly visible and influential public figure. As a result, the
idea of a peaceful federation among free and autarchic cities was well known in Athens and the
intellectual circles of the ancient world.44
From a historical point of view Xenophon recounted the formation of the Chalkidian League and
suggested that it was at the brink of becoming the most powerful federal state in Hellas (circa
385-383 B.C.).45 However he did not favor Panhellenism but put the dangers of forming such a
powerful state in the mouths of the envoys from two states that felt threatened by the league. The
interesting point of this episode is that the Chalkidian communities had not merged into a new
political body or been subjected by a powerful state but had instead retained their local,
38

Panegyricus, 50.
Peace, 20.
40
Ibid., 17.
41
Ibid., 24.
42
Ibid., 41.
43
Ibid., 133-139.
44
Whether federal regimes actually did promote social stability is a different question. The positive evaluation by
Montesquieu and the Federalists has been refuted by contemporary historical scholarship, see Beck, Polis und
Koinon. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte und Struktur der griechischen Bundesstaaten im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.
(Stuttgart: Franz Steiner ,1997), 251-254.
45
Xenophon, Hellenica, ed. and transl. Gisela Strasburger (Zürich: Artemis, 1988), V. ii. 11-19.
39
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autonomous identity, since the league was based on the principle of dual citizenship
(sympoliteía). Therefore, the envoys warned that Olynthus, the head of the league, would become
even more powerful as the states had granted each other reciprocal rights of intermarriage and
property, and other communities would soon realize the advantages of belonging to this league.
Thus, speculations about new kind of federal regimes based on dual citizenship and reciprocal
economic and social rights were not confined to grand speeches but were grounded in actual
political developments.46
It is more difficult to articulate the philosophical foundation underlying these considerations.
Nevertheless it is possible to assemble some elements that bolster the Panhellenic
cosmopolitanism. For both Isocrates and Xenophon the negative part of the theory can be easily
asserted. They each invoke Socrates as a founding figure, but go on to advocate (and ascribe to
Socrates) a strict anti-metaphysical attitude. Isocrates holds that education should have only a
practical value and that all sciences should serve this end. Therefore abstract theory or philosophy
would only be useful as "gymnastics for the soul" but should not be studied in their own right.
These lines are obviously directed against the Platonic Academy. Xenophon similarly portrays
Socrates as someone who gives good and well-reasoned practical advice, for instance that Athens
should invest in a proper cavalry, trained not by politicians or philosophers but by experienced
cavalrymen. In addition, he depicts Socrates as being ignorant or hostile with regard to
metaphysical speculation about the good itself. Xenophon's Socrates says: "I don't know nothing
that is not good for anything and I do not wish to know it either."47 Again Plato is accused of
forgery: the "real" Socrates never discussed "metaphysics" or ideas that are not good for any
practical end.
It is more difficult to ascertain the specific philosophical principles underlying this form of
cosmopolitanism. This is part of the general problem that no major philosophical treatise
apparently existed about Greek democracy.48 Popper solves this mystery by attributing a
cosmopolitan political theory to the early generation of sophists whom he calls the "Great
46

The actual history of the Chalkidian league is less glorious. It lost a bitter war against Sparta and was then
dissolved. Toynbee refers to this episode to speculate whether instead of the reactionary monarchical model of
Macedonia the federal city state model of Olynthus could have prevailed in Hellas and as a consequence Olynthus
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Generation".49 In his reading the school of Gorgias – Antisthenes, Alcidamas and Lycophron –
held egalitarian theories and believed in a brotherhood of all men.50 He particularly credits
Antisthenes for being the only true pupil of Socrates because he defended egalitarian and
cosmopolitan principles. Popper argues that Antisthenes is the implicit target of Plato's scorn at
many places in the Politeia and in other works.51 In trying to find a positive counter image to
Plato, Popper clearly overshoots the mark, as when he portrays Xenophanes as a critical
rationalist,52 Lycophron as a libertarian53 and claims that 5th century cosmopolitanism was linked
to an anti-slavery movement.54 Plato's representation of the sophists as swindlers and real
corrupter of the youth is obviously one-sided, but simply reversing the negative value judgment
doesn't do justice to the movement.55 What can be said is that the sophists questioned traditional
authority, favored education over noble origin, and appeared in Athens at a time when egalitarian
and democratic principles were widely held.56 Thus, all of them shared the optimistic belief that
success is based on individual effort and can be taught. At least some of them defended the
political principles on which Athens was based, legal and political egalitarianism (isonomía), the
equal right to address the assembly and bring charges (isegoría), equal representation in
government by lot (isokratía) and freedom of speech (parrhesía).57
IV. I have painted Panhellenic cosmopolitanism in broad strokes in order to show what kind of
theorizing Plato faced. At this point it would be possible to use historical and philological studies
to elaborate on the variety of views held by different sophists, try to determine how people in
various places reacted to political changes, and how social life evolved in the 4th century.
time can be reconstructed. Kurt A. Raaflaub, "Contemporary Perceptions of Democracy in Fifth-Century Athens,"
Classica et Mediaevalia 40 (1989): 33-70.
49
Karl Popper, Open Society, 185.
50
Ibid., 152.
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Ibid., 614-615.
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Ibid., 572.
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Ibid., 114.
54
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and nature has not enslaved anyone. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, I 13, 1373b.
55
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However, even when concentrating on Athens, it is difficult to integrate Plato in a historical
narrative of this kind. On the one hand he is the founding father of philosophy and has shaped the
whole of Western culture, but on the other hand, he is an exceptional figure of his own time. The
question I would like to focus on is not historical or exegetical but philosophical, and it emerges
from today's perspective. The idea of history as social and moral progress culminating in the
culture of Athens,58 the prevailing anti-metaphysical attitude, the celebration of equality, and last
but not least the general cosmopolitan spirit look like a mirror image of contemporary
cosmopolitanism. We might ask, then, how the development of philosophy as a discipline related
to this historical context. How is it possible that ideas and principles that seem self-evident today
and characteristic of our age actually predate the formation of philosophy as an academic
discipline in Plato and Aristotle? And why has political philosophy in the tradition of Plato and
Aristotle ignored these cosmopolitan roots, and instead, taken a very different route than the one
outlined by the sophists, rhetoricians and historians?
V. As a first approach I should point out that this is actually not a new question; indeed this
question emerged right along with the beginning of academic philosophy around the time Plato
lived. Even though we have no source that posed the question in precisely this way, we can find a
response to this question in the letters handed down under Plato's name. These letters were
known and discussed in antiquity but only received closer attention again in the late 19th
century.59 The seventh letter is the longest and most central, in which the author, presumably
Plato or someone speaking in Plato's name, defends himself against accusations of befriending a
tyrant, accusations that were evidently widespread in Athens. The nature of the accusation
becomes clearer upon reading the thirteenth letter, which was obviously written during Plato's
lifetime (all the details about Plato, his family and friends are correct) but written with the aim of
discrediting Plato. In the letter addressed to Dionysius II Plato asks for money for himself, his
58
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family, and his friends and implicitly offers to work in return as an informant about affairs in
Athens. The thirteenth letter 'reveals' Plato as a self-serving, unpatriotic, tyrant-friendly charlatan.
Most of the other letters elaborate on topics mentioned in the seventh letter but do not offer any
new philosophical arguments (and sometimes even confuse events or persons, which can be taken
as a sign of forgery). As a result, they are often ignored in philosophical interpretations, however,
they are an important source about the reception of Plato.
The seventh letter recounts Plato’s journeys to Sicily but also reflects in more general terms on
the relation of philosophy to politics, the importance of friendship, trustworthiness of politicians
and on Plato’s motives. The other letters also touch upon these topics, but in addition they stress
certain aspects that are not central in the seventh letter. When we read the letters together like an
epistolary novel60 a specific picture of Plato emerges. He appears to be a very practical-minded
political advisor, someone with a broad knowledge of different constitutions who proposes
constitutions specifically appropriate for various local circumstances.61 The overall aim of his
engagement in Syracuse was establishing peace62 throughout Sicily by striking a compromise
between different factions and setting up an arbiter for settling disputes.63 Plato's proposal is
based on the rule of law, stressing equality of all,64 aims at securing Greek freedom65 and
benefitting all people. It is notably a constitution not just for the city of Syracuse but for all the
cities of Sicily.66 Their union should not be achieved in an imperial fashion67 but by establishing
bonds between friends in various cities.68 Yet the regime Plato proposes is not just a modus
vivendi but intends, for the first time in history, to realize the unlikely union of philosophy and
political power.69 For this reason the events in Syracuse are carefully observed not only in Athens
but also by people all over the world.70 The Platonic Academy plays a central role in this
narrative. Plato is depicted as sending and receiving letters to different areas and places in the
debate, see arguing against their authenticity Ludwig Edelstein, Plato's Seventh Letter (Leiden: Brill, 1966) and in
favor, the critical review by Friedrich Solmsen, Gnomon 41 (1969): 29-34.
60
For the idea to read the letters as a whole see Hartmut Längin, "Erzählkunst und Philosophie in den Platon
Briefen," Grazer Beiträge 22 (1998): 101-144.
61
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Hellenic world (to Perdikkas, King of Macedonia,71 to friends of the academy in Asia Minor,72 to
Archytas of Tarent, a Pythagorean philosopher king73) and establishing friendships between
philosophers and politicians.74 Therefore Plato's Sicilian adventure is not an isolated event or a
misstep but can be read as a paradigm intended for other areas, or even for all of Hellas. The
ultimate danger looming at the horizon is that if Platonic justice is not realized, Greek language
and culture could vanish from the world after a barbarian conquest.75
Thus the subtext of the letters is that Plato is the spiritual center of a wide-ranging intellectual
community that tries to foster the Panhellenic cause as an intellectual and a well-reasoned
military and political alliance through practical advice.76 However, the letters where this idea is
most evident (Epistles 4, 5, 8, 11) are the ones most scholars consider to be not genuine.77
Nevertheless, they are germane, since they were written around Plato's lifetime, arguably in the
context of the academy, and thus by persons who supported (or intended to support) Plato's
cause. So we might imagine that people during Plato's lifetime thought: "This is what he should
have written: constant civil strife is destroying our civilization and Panhellenic cosmopolitanism
(and possibly, peace with Persia) is the obvious solution." But this is not what Plato actually
wrote in his philosophical dialogues. On the contrary: The rhetorical, historical and sophistic
tradition I have just described, which appears like a mirror image of contemporary
cosmopolitanism, is precisely what Plato opposed. Thus, we are confronted with a renversement
des alliances. The tradition of political philosophy that has started with Plato, turns out not to be
a natural friend of contemporary cosmopolitanism at all, but may actually be its archenemy.
VI. In a more detailed interpretation of the Politeia, I will now show how Plato managed to
silence these cosmopolitan voices, namely by inventing philosophy as dialectic endeavor. In this
way, I propose to read the Platonic dialogues as conscious interventions in the discourses of his
time.
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The question I ask is not simply 'historical’ (which of the sophists could be correctly categorized
as cosmopolitan) nor merely 'systematic’ (thereby presupposing our philosophical premises and
historical views as the only correct ones). Instead, I want to use a contemporary horizon of
understanding to ask questions whose answers might change our understanding not only of Plato
but of ourselves as well.78 To establish a fair playing field, Plato's cosmopolitan opponents can be
given all manner of support from today's cosmopolitan majority. Plato's philosophy is particularly
well suited for this kind of systematic discussion through a historical lens since he uses the same
method himself. Like most of his other early and middle dialogues, the Politeia is clearly set in
the past. However, the Politeia is not a piece of historical scholarship, and no historical novel
either. Instead, Plato shows that philosophy can be enacted through various voices in different
historical settings. This not only separates positions and arguments from persons, but also allows
historical time to become a variable.79 Thus, there is no natural necessity to speak in one’s own
name like the rhetoricians, or to speak only about present people and the present time. These are
all variables that need to be taken up in the dialectical reflection.
One might object that this line of interpretation confronts an apparently insurmountable difficulty
from the outset. Apart from a few strategic remarks80 Plato barely addresses the problem of interpolis relations, nor does he deal directly with Isocrates' Panhellenic ideals or make use of
Xenophon's histories in his speculations. This has led philosophers to conclude that Plato (and
Aristotle) were simply unaware or uninterested in these questions, that they were not anticosmopolitan but utterly un-cosmopolitan.81
Against this common assumption I will try to show that it is still possible to read Plato with these
questions in mind, either in their ancient or in their contemporary form. Moreover, I would
suggest that Plato played with this kind of expectations from his audience. Thus, the dialogue is
not directed at Glaucon and Adeimantus, who were both dead at the time the dialogue was
written,82 but at readers and listeners in the fourth century, who were concerned about political
78
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affairs in Hellas.83 The political questions on people’s minds were whether Sparta could maintain
its supremacy, whether Athens could rise again or perhaps another city, and what would part
powers at the periphery and the Persians would play in their future. To put the expectations of
Plato's likely audience in a nutshell, we could say: The prize is Hellas. What is the future of the
Hellenic world and how will we fare in it?
VII. Plato’s opening scene plays with these expectations. It has been often remarked how the first
few sentences foreshadow the structure of the dialogue, first grabbing Socrates (the archetype of
the philosopher), playfully forcing him to come back (and rule), then offering additional
arguments to support the quest, to which Socrates gives in for his own reasons.84 However the
setting of the dialogue also carries a clear political message. The first meeting takes place on the
way from Piraeus to Athens, literally in the shadow of the long walls built as part of Pericles'
grand strategy to secure Athens’ position as a land power. Moreover, Piraeus, the scene of the
dialogue, is Athens' cosmopolitan harbor city, a meeting place for people from all parts of the
civilized world, the stronghold of the democratic party and the place where resident aliens
(Metics) were allowed to settle. In this setting Cephalus, the representative of tradition, has the
first say. One has to keep in mind that at the time of the dialogue, the prevailing tradition was
already the democratic tradition. Given this context and Cephalus' standing as a respected elder
of his community, the reader might expect something like Pericles' funeral speech, or in any case
a speech about the wealth and honor of the city, how they reflect on each man living in the city
and how the personal grace of being rich and having sons contributes to a good life.85 As he so
often does, Plato plays with the reader’s expectations only to disappoint them. Cephalus talks
Socrates" was a well established literary genre and everybody knew that Glaucon has left no impact on political or
cultural life in Athens. So saving Glaucon from politics is a non-starter. See Allen Bloom, "Response to Hall,"
Political Theory 5 (1977): 315-330.
83
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by ordinary citizens let alone recited like a Homeric epos, as understanding the Politeia requires profound
philosophical schooling and elaborate discussion.
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instead about sex life in old age and his personal salvation. In this way, Plato demonstrates right
from the outset that ordinary expectations regarding the proper subject of a book about the
Politeia– something along the lines of the historical development of institutions, their functions
and benefits for people living under them – completely misses the mark.86 Instead Plato starts
with a very introspective discussion about justice as a way to gain personal salvation and never
gets back to the question of Athens' place in the Hellenic world. Thus Plato’s first move is to
irritate the cosmopolitans by introducing the representative of the traditional democratic elite of
Piraeus and letting him ask a question that shatters the self-assurance of the traditional way of
life. Cephalus' question recalls Martin Luther's justification of his stubborn heretical stance: "For
what does it profit a man to gain the whole world, and forfeit his soul?"87 Cephalus' question is
similarly heretical if we read it from the foil of cosmopolitan sentiments. Cephalus responds to
these political considerations as follows: "The rise of democratic Athens to greatness, its
leadership by example rather than force and its mission of uniting Greek cities to a civilized
commonwealth88 – all this is meaningless to me if my soul would suffer." The same metaphysical
theological question about personal salvation and life after death reappears at the very end of the
Politeia in Book 10. This indicates that Cephalus’ question is not merely an introduction to
prepare us for the 'real' question of the Politeia, about 'what the best regime is,' but instead,
reveals the true dimensions of the question of justice. If the question were limited from the outset
to the 'political domain,' Cepahlus’ question ("What's in it for me, for my soul?") would still be
looming in the background and might justify withdrawing from the discussion altogether.
However, Cephalus is not interested in personal salvation alone, but prepares the discussion by
presenting (together with his son Polemarchus) the traditional view of justice as "saying the truth
and giving back what is due," a position that is then disputed by the sophist Thrasymachus.
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VIII. In the dialogue, the sophist Thrasymachus intervenes directly after the traditional defense of
justice. Implicitly, Plato casts the sophistic movement in a specific way, namely as ruining the
tradition. However in historical terms, that is, in terms of the historic progression of philosophical
theories, one would have to say that the first sophists questioned the tradition but generally
supported a democratic and cosmopolitan lifestyle.89 Only the second generation of sophists
challenged morality and developed realist or immoral theories of the kind we know from
Callicles and Thrasymachus. One reason that Plato presents the sophists as immoralists is
obviously to give them a bad name, and reserve the notion of philosophy for the good side, or at
any rate, the side opposed to the immoralists.90 It would have been much harder for Plato to argue
directly against a democratic cosmopolitan who, at the time the Politeia is set (around 423 BCE),
still had the rise of Athens as an economic and cultural power on his side to support his claims.
Instead, Plato uses the historical setting and the persons to present a systematic argument
applicable to his own time. I would suggest that we can best assess the force and method of this
argument if we consider the cosmopolitan consequences of the positions attacked by Plato, that
is, by imagining a 4th century reader familiar with the sophistic tradition, the teachings of
Isocrates, and, like Xenophon, interested in contemporary politics.
Over the course of the argument in book I and II, Plato basically presents three different views
regarding justice: 1. Justice means saying the truth and giving back what is due (Cephalus and
Polemarchus), 2. Justice is a convention out of fear (Glaucon as advocatus diaboli), and 3)
Justice is what serves the stronger (Thrasymachus). I do not want to repeat the argument in all its
intriguing details. Instead, I would like to single out two aspects.
First, all of the principles presented could also govern relations between various poleis. It is to be
noted that at this point of the dialogue justice is discussed in a general way but not yet restricted
to the analogy of city and soul. Plato proposes a definition and then tests it by using different
examples ("Is it just to return a sword to a madman?") or by putting it in context ("Has every art a
specific end or is earning money the end of every art?"). In principle one could also ask, for
instance, whether circumstances exist where no city owes anything to another city,91 whether just
89
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behavior of cities is merely conventional, a sign of fear or indeed illusion or stupidity. (One
might think of the famous Melior dialogue where these questions are raised). The Panhellenic or
cosmopolitan dimension of the discussion is even mentioned explicitly. Thrasymachus explains
his definition of injustice as wisdom and virtue by arguing that those who practice it can
"subjugate cities and tribes of men to themselves" (I 348d), thus citing a kind of government
(power) that includes not just different cities but even different peoples. He is thereby arguably
alluding to the Persian Empire, which usually serves as the archetype of an (unjust) tyranny in
Greek literature.92 However, as a good sophist, Thrasymachus turns the value judgment around
by arguing that this kind of regime is indeed a prudent one. Thus, Thrasymachus' thinking is not
confined to the world of independent cities. Instead, Thrasymachus is arguing as a realist, and
contends that an imperial regime will be the future of Hellas and might even, at some time, be
called 'just'. (In hindsight he was right. The flourishing Hellenic commonwealth of free and
politically independent cities turned out to be only a brief episode.)
However, such cosmopolitan implications are not explicitly spelled out. Socrates even cloaks this
dimension by mostly using examples from the sphere of personal ethics or human behavior.
While disputing Thrasymachus, though, he does cite the example of a city that attacks or
oppresses another without justification. (I 351c) This example is important, for it shows that
Socrates does not restrict the term justice to individuals or to the order of a polis, but uses it
instead as a general term also applicable to relations between poleis and other groups. Of course,
this does not mean that Plato had anything like a theory of "Hellenic justice", let alone "global
justice" in mind; quite the contrary (as I will show later). It is merely evidence that in terms of the
ordinary, pre-philosophical or sophistic discussion Socrates is engaged in at this stage, interpoleis relations are not a special case, only to be discussed in a 'second step' after justice is
established in the polis, but rather, a part of the broad range of examples one is talking about.
The second aspect I would like to single out is the nature of the discussion demonstrated in Book
I and the beginning of Book II. One might think that Plato is selling the different sophistic
theories of justice short, that somehow principles such as truthfulness and reciprocity (mentioned
by Cephalus) must feature in the definition of justice, that a social contract theory (mentioned by
Glaucon) is a useful explanatory or justificatory device, and finally that Plato ostensively appears
92
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to be turning a blind eye to the central quality of justice, namely equality.93 It is certainly possible
to pursue any of these lines. The way Plato presents the discussion, though, shows that he has
something quite different in mind. At the end of the discussion with Thrasymachus (I 354b-c),
Socrates declares that no conclusion has been reached, and moreover, that no positive conclusion
could ever be reached in this way. This confession by Socrates should be taken seriously. The
innovative idea or milestone achieved by the Politeia is precisely to show that all 'sophistic'
discussions, even those by Socrates94 are aporetic and that real inquiry (which later turns out to be
philosophy) consists of something else.
IX. The follow-up question, of course, is what the additional insight provided by philosophy is,
and why Socratic inquiry is insufficient; after all, it seems to help unmask false generalities, and
even comes up with some positive principles, such as "doing harm can never be an act of justice
as no art makes its subject worse." It would appear that Socrates suggests that real philosophy
only starts at a later stage. However, he does not state in terms of a 'theory' the difference
between 'real philosophy' and 'sophistic arguing'.95 After the aporetic result in book I Socrates has
to be 'held on to' and 'forced' to continue developing his argument in response to the challenges
brought forward by Glaucon and Adeimantus. What can be said is that in terms of content, the
question is now posed in a more demanding way: Socrates is asked to show that justice is one of
the aims that is pursued for its benefits and for its own sake (II 367b-d) and that the just man is
the happiest man. In terms of method, a superficial reading would suggest that Socrates gives up
the dialectical or discursive style of argumentation after Book I, since he no longer engages in a
discussion with strong-minded interlocutor but mainly presents his view monologically. The
question of what kind of inquiry Socrates wants to turn his attention to remains open. At this
point, it is only a promise: real philosophy will come later.
Yet Socrates’ promise has repercussions on the cosmopolitan perspectives implied by the setting
of the initial arguments. If the overall argument is that sophistic argumentation is a deficient kind
of arguing then spelling out cosmopolitan consequences and defending them in the same,
sophistic or traditional way would do little to promote the course of the cosmopolitan. If all
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sophistic arguments end up in an aporía regardless whether they pursue the "good" cosmopolitan
or the "evil" immoralist course, then the most important task is to pursue the single course that
promises a way out of the quandary, and not to expand upon the details of wishful thinking. In
this first set of arguments, similar to the opening scene, Plato plays with the cosmopolitan
expectations of his audience but he does not refute them by presenting 'anti-cosmopolitan
arguments.' Instead, he silences them by posing a question more radical than any posed by the
sophists (is justice good in itself) and by demanding a more fundamental theory (is the just man
the happiest man even in unhappy circumstances?).
X. A possible criticism of this line of interpretation might be to claim that the setting of the
dialogue in a cosmopolitan context and some scattered hints about other cities are insufficient
evidence for the claim that cosmopolitan theory functions as an implicit counter position. A
further objection might insist that Socrates by presenting ideas about the best city over the
various stages excludes the question of a cosmopolitan order from the outset. However, I will
show that a cosmopolitan interlocutor is a useful device throughout the entire dialogue to elicit
the consequences of Plato's position and is even explicitly presumed by Plato himself. In other
words, one has to be careful not to read too much Aristotle into Plato.
Plato develops the idea of a just city as an analogy to the soul, in order to be able to observe
justice as being written in big letters. (II 368c-d) Even though he starts with a description of
human relations (II 369 b-d) he doesn't start with the idea of a 'society' (let alone a closed society
of free and equals) nor does he presume the polis as the natural aim of man. Instead, he argues it
is more convenient for people if each one specializes in what he does best. (369e-370a) Thus a
'loner' who lives completely on his own would have a difficult life but is not ruled out.96 Plato
then shows that the various professions emerge from the needs people have for each other. (II
369e-371e) The city of bare necessity or the healthy city that evolves in this way is often quickly
dismissed in discussions of Plato to focus exclusively, over the intermediate step of the feverish
city, on the complete city. I would argue instead that the first two models of the city are
important, even with respect to the two subsequent ideal models (the guardians' city and the
philosophers' city). Both the healthy city and the feverish city can be read as implicit responses to
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cosmopolitan pretensions. The model of the healthy city would even be (to use an anachronistic
idea) universalizable.
If all peoples on earth lived the 'healthy lifestyle' prescribed by Socrates for people living in the
healthy city, and complied with some form of traditional ethics, including provisions for
hospitality, the main causes of war, poverty, and large-scale migration would be absent. Plato
does not specific any provision regarding traditional ethics, including hospitality, however the
desire for the arts suggests that people are civilized.97 This model vaguely recalls Rawls' society
of liberal peoples98 who all practice justice but never go to war; the difference is that in Plato's
healthy stadium of mankind, political institutions seem to be absent. One can only speculate
whether decisions that need to be made are arrived at unanimously, as in primitive or pre-statal
societies. In any case, Plato's spokesman Socrates doesn't say that this kind of life is impossible.
It is Glaucon who denounces this life as a "city of sows" (II 372d) or, as one may translate
loosely, rules for keeping livestock of the human kind.99 Moreover it is also Glaucon and not
Socrates who demands more luxuries to satisfy his human desires for luxuries. Plato argues that
the need for conquest, an army and all the sciences that deal with human ills emerge out of the
spirited desire of wanting-to-have-more. His argument is not meant as an exhaustive explanation
of the origins of wars and illnesses; there may an indefinite number of additional causes.
The more interesting question is how this development appears to the eye of the philosopher. The
people living in healthy circumstances100 practice justice as "minding one's own business" and
maintain a moderate lifestyle that would certainly please Socrates. They actually have more
luxuries than Socrates' kynic pupils would grant themselves (figs for dessert). (II 372c) One
could ask whether Socrates could be satisfied with this state of affairs. Could this be a home for a
philosopher? It is Glaucon who states the philosophical problem about this primitive form of
cosmopolitanism (or ‘cosmo-anarchism’): Justice and injustice is not seen "unless it's somewhere
in some needs these men have of one another." (II 372a) Justice is happening behind these
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people’s backs, so to speak, but its principle is not obvious to them. For this reason there can be
no philosophy in this place and it is arguably for this reason that Socrates gives in so quickly to
Glaucon's demand instead of trying to teach him (like Xenophon's Socrates) to have only
'reasonable' desires.101 One interesting point in the argument is that indirectly even the
philosopher would have an interest in the evolution of the healthy city into the feverish city,
because only after this change do the social conditions of justice as "minding one's own business"
become institutionalized in such a way as to become discernible.102
Of course, the story Plato tells of the development of the healthy city into the feverish city is a
story of degeneration, and the miseries faced by the feverish city sets the stage for the purging of
the city by the guardians. Still, it is worth noting that the feverish city is not merely an
intermediate step but also expresses one variety of cosmopolitanism, which becomes the constant
counterfoil for the rest of the dialogue. It is not out of evil intentions but out of practical necessity
that the feverish city practices something we might call economic cosmopolitanism. This form of
cosmopolitanism is easily paired with an imperialistic strategy. One may object that imperialistic
cosmopolitanism is a contradictio in adjecto, as every variety of cosmopolitanism is opposed to
aggressive wars or violent takeovers. However, in these short passages, Plato is presenting a
materialistic theory of the development of societies. Presumably, the feverish city will not regard
itself as imperialistic but will sail under false colors, e.g. like Rome, think of itself as a republic
with nothing more in mind than the moral improvement of the world. In terms of policy and
outlook this city resembles and satirizes the politics of 4th century Athens. Even modern
historians have trouble keeping up with the many wars Athens fought or financed abroad, most of
them arguably launched out of purely economic calculations. Nevertheless, the feverish city
represents a precondition for the emergence of a warrior class that can be subsequently used to
purge the city from all of its ills. It is to be noted that Plato explicitly reserves the term polis in
the true sense to the purified city of warriors. Thus the construction of the ideal polis can truly be
seen as a response to two kinds of cosmopolitan pretentions.
XI. At this point one might still think that exploiting possible cosmopolitan consequences of
Plato's presentation is a far-fetched argument and that in presenting his ideal of the closed city,
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Plato did not overcome the cosmopolitans but simply ignored them. One might reason the model
of a closed society has shaped philosophical discourse ever since, and Plato's theory been the
endlessly recurrent subject of study for so many generations of young lads. However this is not
the way that the Politeia was always received over the course of the history of philosophy103 nor
was it Plato’s aim to propose an 'ideal theory' of a closed society that can then be applied to 'non
ideal circumstances'. The model of the city is only one part of a dialogue that is once again filled
with implicit references to other ideas and to other Platonic dialogues.
So what do we make of Plato's construction of the ideal city? One way to approach the question
is to ask why anyone, especially his cosmopolitan contemporaries, should be convinced by
Plato's construction? In the dramatization of the argument it is striking that Socrates repeatedly
takes pleasure in upsetting his interlocutors by piling one absurd detail upon the other (e.g. men
and women practicing together naked V 457b). And yet, his interlocutors remain silent for the
rest of the dialogue. Couldn’t they have responded to Socrates' suggestions or – in best sophistic
manner – let the weaker case appear stronger? In what sense, then, is the Politeia intended as a
philosophical exploration of justice in distinction to a sophistic short trip?
These questions can be answered by following the course of the dialogue. Socrates complains
jokingly that he has to overcome three waves of attacks, first justifying the equality of men and
women, second the community of men and women, and third the philosopher's rule. (V 473c)
Before he starts with this line of argument, he had to be forced to continue in a way that echoes
the introductory scene. So the question is what do these stages, so clearly marked, signify? This is
a far-reaching question, since Socrates would seem to have already finished his task of explaining
the analogy of city and soul at the end of Book IV. What do these additional elements – the
equality and community of men and women, and especially the education of philosophers – tell
us?
One way to evaluate Plato's theory would be to ask whether the analogy of city and soul is
convincing, taking the fully-developed city as Plato's definite model.104 However, this reading
would not explain the function of the argument with regard to other 'sophistic' approaches. The
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Politeia would then appear as just one theory among many, and, due to its complicated multilayered structure, not even a particularly convincing one. So it is easy to imagine that neither the
modern-day reader nor the reader in Plato’s world would swallow the argument. If Plato's aim
was to propose the ideal of a constitution for a city with oligarchic tendencies then why did he
present his claims in this way? And what is the source of his confidence that there is nothing a
sophist could possibly say against it?
We initially find the answer to the second part of the question, the basis for Plato's confidence, in
the form of an assertion: unlike the sophist, the philosopher is defined as the one who can
distinguish between mere opinion and (true) knowledge. (V 476c-480a) Thus, Plato is confident
that he is the first person to practice philosophy as a Wissenschaft,105 i.e. to seek knowledge in a
comprehensive and systematic way. (VI 486e) The philosopher is the person who realizes that
everything that has been presented thus far is connected and who doesn't stop his quest before he
has grasped the truth entirely. (VI 485b)
Yet, providing a specific definition of philosophy does not prove that such a thing really exists.
Anyone could make the same claim, including Plato's opponents, and state that their view is
Wissenschaft as well. We should recall that the sophists were not just political journalists and
orators but also taught science (astronomy, mathematics, musical theory), and some, like
Protagoras, had ideas about linguistics as well. It is particularly instructive to realize that Plato
concedes this point, not only that such a dispute exists, but also that philosophy as Wissenschaft
has no conclusive means to stop this discussion. In the Politeia the dispute is referred to in Book
VI, just before the allegories that culminate in the ascent from the cave are presented. Here, there
are oblique references to all of Plato's contemporary opponents, including the cosmopolitans.
And it is at this moment in the dialogue where the distinctive feature of Plato's philosophy is
introduced, enclosed in the allegory of the cave.
After refuting the sophists, and after developing the analogy of city and soul, Socrates still
concedes that "the many" will be unable to distinguish the true philosopher from false sophists.
On the contrary, the many will falsely blame philosophers for pupils who turn out badly (VI
487c-d), when in fact, those pupils were taught by sophists. Moreover, Socrates points out that
there are teachers or intellectuals (easily identified as Gorgias and Isocrates) who claim to be
philosophers and even use a technique of argumentation that resembles philosophical practice,
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although it consists only in hairsplitting, stubbornness and pointless quarrels. (VI 498e-499a)
Even Thrasymachus is briefly mentioned as a possible opponent, although not allowed to speak
for himself. (VI 497d) Of course, Socrates' assurance that "Thrasymachus has become his friend"
and is therefore only listening obsequiously is ironic; in real life, Thrasymachus would join the
cosmopolitan-minded sophists while attacking the philosopher from the other side. At this point
Plato also explains that even the very best philosophical nature can go astray by trying to mind
the business of "both Hellenes and barbarians." (VI 494c) Thus Plato explicitly introduces a
cosmopolitan opponent, even granting he might have a good philosophical nature, but insisting
that, like all the sophists, rhetoricians and historians, he is fundamentally mistaken.
It is pointless to speculate about exactly whom Plato had in mind as this opponent. It may not
even be a real person, and Plato may simply be raising the systematic possibility of a
cosmopolitan position that is characterized by "minding the business of Hellenes and barbarians."
Thus, after having presented his 'theory' Plato grants there could be someone responding to it in
the style of a 'liberal' cosmopolitan – but he would not be counted among the philosophers.
However we are still left with the question of how to explain the distinction between the true
philosophous and false philodoxous (V 480a). Plato's claim is that philosophy is a fundamentally
different kind of endeavor. Therefore, what Plato develops is not an anti-cosmopolitan theory;
this would presume that there are two kinds of theory, one cosmopolitan and one anticosmopolitan, and that both can argue for their claims on an even playing field. Plato is taking the
discussion beyond this stage, so he is not anti-cosmopolitan but über-cosmopolitan. Yet, how can
this position be achieved?
XII. This step is again marked by the motif of holding on to the philosopher. (VI 505a) Plato
shows that the way to get to philosophy as Wissenschaft is in the form of a simple question,
namely, after justice has been introduced and explained, asking: but is it really good. (VI 506a)
This question sounds simple but in fact, it is very powerful, for it requires digging into the
foundations of one's own theory. The question insists on inquiring whether the theory is based
only on sentiments we may have at a certain moment in history or on the latest 'score' in an
ongoing sophistic quarrel. Alternatively the theory could explain its own relationship to its time
and surrounding world in such a way as to let us understand ourselves and others in a more
comprehensive (Plato would say dialectical) way. Plato's strategy is to demarcate philosophy
from sophistic theories by asking the additional question "is it really good" and, while answering
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the question, providing his theory with deeper foundation, a foundation that can in retrospect be
called 'metaphysical'. (VI 506a)

But what exactly is this 'metaphysical' foundation that is

prompted by the quest for the good? At first, Plato only offers a criterion, that there must be some
overall systematic interconnection, names a method (dialectic), and then goes on to introduce his
famous allegories (the sun, the line, and the cave). What Plato is doing in these examples is
foremost not introducing a positive theory of metaphysics but instead, demonstrating a practice
that has already informed the whole dialogue, albeit subliminally. Plato's allegories provide us
with an answer as to why Plato presents his theory in this particular way, even though he knows
that it will be unconvincing (for sophists). He presents his theory in this way because he wants to
demonstrate that above all, philosophy is something that has to be practiced among like-minded
people.
It is notoriously difficult to explain what exactly Plato's 'metaphysical' theory is, in particular, the
specific nature of the highest good, and how it relates to the theory of ideas, which Plato
frequently mentions but never really explains. In the Politeia Socrates remarks incidentally "let's
leave aside for the time being what the good itself is" (VI 506e) (and this time nobody holds on to
him!). One could, of course, explain Plato's theory of ideas as best as possible, examine the
historical critique, and ask whether the theory is convincing. However, the same question would
reappear: why does Plato present the 'metaphysical' theory in this way? The question is further
reinforced when Socrates admits in the dialogue that the highest ideas cannot be grasped by
everyone (at least not by Glaucon) or even be fully explained. (VI 506b-507a) The Plato of the
seventh letter even states explicitly: "there neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on this
subject." 106
Given our reading up to this point, Plato’s confession may seem particularly disappointing. He
has omitted a more detailed institutional exposition of the best city and a defense against rival
theories by suggesting a deeper foundation – and now, this deeper foundation has turned out to be
elusive. Yet, Plato's metaphysics is not simply an artfully constructed mysticism aimed at
concealing his outright oligarchic leanings.107 Instead, he has introduced us to a certain kind of
questioning.
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XIII. After sketching the allegory of the cave, Plato presents a second education program
(paidèia), this time not for all guardians but only for the philosopher. As illustrated by the
allegory, the objective is to "turn the soul around" and "guide it from the becoming to the being."
(VII 521c-d) Plato explains that there are different way leading to this kind of questioning, and
thus, the question after the good is not the only way into philosophy. Plato starts with arithmetic
and then proceeds through various disciplines. (VII 522b-531c) The leading idea is always the
same and may be explained by using the example of arithmetic. The technique of calculating
numbers for practical purposes was already known in Mesopotamia and Egypt. However it was
the Greek mathematicians who realized that it was also possible to ask pure theoretical questions
about arithmetic. (VII 525c) We might argue that with his discussion of arithmetic (VII 522b526c) Plato is suggesting that the way we conceive of numbers (in modern terminology:
following the logicistic or intuitionistic program) has consequences for the way we recognize
ourselves and our relation to the world.108 Therefore arithmetic is "one of those things we are
seeking that by nature lead to intellection." (VII 523a) It is not my intention here to delve into the
philosophy of mathematics, but it may be worth pointing out that similar questions were asked
only again during the foundational crisis in mathematics that took place at the beginning of the
20th century. In any case, the ensuing question of why the physical world is ordered according to
mathematical laws in the first place, and how we can have access to both worlds has certainly not
been 'solved by modern science'.109
Thus, Plato is not making claims just based on shaky mysticism but instead, provides examples
for the kind of proofs and discussions he is thinking about. He also offers a criterion for how
research ought to be conducted, by looking for systematic coherence among all the sciences that
are jointly illuminated by the agathón. Thus systematic coherence is a criterion for philosophy as
Wissenschaft, but coherence is not the sole or principal criterion. If this were so, Plato's theory
would be similar to the natural sciences, where the challenge is to assemble different building
Illusion der Gerechtigkeit. Eine kritische Untersuchung der Sozialphilosophie Platons, ed. Kurt Ringhofer and
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blocks in the best possible way. The important feature of philosophy as Wissenschaft is the
practice to which it belongs, namely the dialectical education of the philosopher.
"Only the dialectical way of inquiry proceeds in this direction, destroying the
hypotheses, to the beginning itself in order to make it secure; and when the eye of the
soul is really buried in a barbaric bog, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up
above, using the arts we described as assistants and helpers in the turning around."
(VII 533d)
Instead of presenting a 'theory of everything' Plato demonstrates how philosophy proceeds as a
dialectical discipline that has its ultimate end in the paidèia, the formation or redirecting of the
philosophical soul.
XIV. I have avoided presenting Plato's actual 'metaphysics' and only marginally discussed his
'political theory' because my main point was to show how Plato first took up the cosmopolitan
sentiments and then overcame them. The initial assumption that Plato developed a theory of a
closed society that as a matter of fact became influential turned out to be too simple. Yet, even
the answer we have now come to, that the clue to Plato's philosophy is providing his political
theory with a 'metaphysical' foundation, which in turn serves an educational end, only explains
some things but does not answer everything. It explains that Plato's typology of political systems
in Book VIII is not intended as a rudimentary form of political science but rather, as indicated
through the introduction ("let the Muses tell us"), a playful ironic enactment of how such a
science might proceed. (VIII 545e) Simply collecting constitutions would be an important task
but would not begin to exhaust what philosophy is about. Only if we made it part of a complete
system (as an ideal) would it lead us to understand ourselves and others.110 The Myth of Er at the
end of Book X is also a way to open the text toward a dialogue with religious ways of thought.
Finally, the harsh ban on the arts (X 595a-608b) may serve to remind the reader that cultural
dispositions can be changed in principle even if they are deep seated at a particular historical
moment. Yet, there are also totalitarian tendencies, and the history of Plato’s reception and
110
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influence reveals that different aspects of his thought have dominated the discussion at different
times over the course of the centuries.111
XV. The present interpretation raises again a different question: why didn't Plato develop his own
'über-cosmopolitan' theory, including a 'metaphysical' basis, and explain how it related to the
Hellenic world? His openness to influences from other cultures, his awareness of cultural
relativity, and even the dialectical method all seem to point in this direction. Moreover, he is not
just addressing Athenians but the learned audience all over the Hellenic world. It has been
indicated earlier that even the writers of Plato's inauthentic letters had this point in mind.
One answer is given by Plato himself. He constantly stressed that only "the few" would be able to
grasp the idea of philosophy. (VI 494a) This assumption in itself may result in an oligarchic
view, but it would not preclude developing a Panhellenic or cosmopolitan perspective perhaps by
elevating Athens as the 'leader of the free world'. However, in Plato the oligarchic view is
sustained by a tragic idea of history. It is best captured in his allegory of the two ages introduced
in the Statesman.112
In this allegory, Plato draws on motifs from different traditions – the reversal of the course of the
universe, the golden time, the clash between two gods, etc. – to sketch a dark image of the state
of man. In the golden time people lived the life of paradise under the rule of the gods, didn't have
to bother about food, housing or clothes as there was always a mild breeze. They were born
asexually as old people and became younger over the course of their lives. When the gods
abandoned their reign, the world became like a ship whose steersman has let go of the steering
wheel so that the ship is tossed about with no direction and ultimately doomed to be shipwrecked.
During this time people procreate, are born young, and have to work for their food. Our time and
our world is thus not the 'natural' or even a good course of the world, but the 'unnatural', reversed
course that is doomed. In this allegory, the contrast between the soul, or the world of ideas, and
the body, or the physical world, is pictured as a contrast in time between an earlier state of the
world and the present. There is nothing in this world or our course of time that is worth
preserving, and our only hope is that the gods will take up the wheel again to rescue the ship from
the surrounding horror of nature. The allegory depicts Plato's tragic view of the trajectory of the
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world. It is not just that some people or political regimes are unjust or some practices should be
reformed. It is the trajectory of the world that is wrong. Only if someone with a god-like soul
assumed total power over some people and reversed the entire order of things might it be possible
to save the world by setting an example.
It should be noted that in Plato’s allegory, the backward course of the world could be
purposefully changed, and so there is no eternal battle between two principles, nor the view that
good and evil are equiprimordial, or as Plato refers to it, that both good and evil given by the
gods. (II 389c)113 In Plato, the 'enlightened' hope that the world can be changed is pushed to its
extreme, for even fundamental aspects of the human condition such as the incest taboo are
depicted as alterable through teaching.114 On the one hand, philosophy presumes an enormous
imaginative power and, by its ability to transform the individual soul to go against various bodily
leanings, and an enormous erotic power as well. On the other hand, it is hard to conceive of
philosophy’s fundamental activity as being nothing less than to be the savior of mankind when its
highest aim, conceiving the good, cannot be 'properly' defined, taught as a technique, or even
written down as a normative guideline. Instead, philosophy appears to be an evasive practice, and
even a modern day reader is never quite certain whether he is in the philosophical mode seeking
insight or just caught up in one of Plato's traps.115
XVI. Again, it would be possible to pursue this line of thought further and try to make sense of
Plato's critique of writing and elusive presentation of the highest ideas.116 However, the aim of
the inquiry was to show why Plato did not simply state his 'cosmopolitan ideal theory on
metaphysical grounds'. Yet reflecting on Plato’s presentation of the practice of philosophy draws
the reader not only to the brink of mysticism but reveals at the same time a limitation of Plato's
philosophy. There is one thing that can be said with certainty about the way Plato conceives of
the practice of philosophy: One must have a teacher, and to be precise, not just any teacher, but
Socrates as a teacher. Philosophy is not an activity everyone can practice in isolation, learn from
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books or from different teachers but instead, a practice that requires initiation. For the way Plato
brought philosophy to the world, it is not an unhappy fact that Socrates was already dead at the
time, but a necessary precondition. Even as Plato wrote his dialogues, no one could not ask the
historical Socrates, "what do you think about this?" or "Plato wrote this, do you agree with it?"
Thus, the Platonic pathway to philosophical education never allows for competing opinions of
equal standing. Moreover real insights are often postponed, withheld, or as by Socrates in the
Symposium uttered in someone else's name.
In terms of real world politics, concentration on one mythical founding figure together with the
establishment of an institution to guarantee the authenticity of interpretation can easily be
translated in a claim for leadership of the Platonic Academy.117 Real insight can only be found
there and requires secret initiation. However, due to the lack of direct evidence, especially any
evidence from Plato himself, our characterization of the Platonic Academy must remain vague
and is only useful to explain the historical context. Yet the evasive reverence to an undefined
center is a feature of Plato's philosophy that has consequences for its reception. One could say
that just as there can be only one initiated philosophical practice there can only be one Kallipolis.
This is an important finding for the present interpretation of Plato as an über-cosmopolitan
philosopher. From Plato's point of view, one could grant that the whole Hellenic world serves as
a backdrop or sounding board, more explicitly, that Panhellenic or cosmopolitan views are part of
that intellectual universe. Plato might even acknowledge that at some time or at some place,
democratic forms of government might turn out to be beneficial, or that formation of federal
alliances might be necessary for economic or military reasons. However, from Plato's point of
view all these aspects of Hellenic political life, in which we may recognize us and our own
contemporary world, would be completely irrelevant as long as it lacked philosophy. It is for this
reason that Plato does not find it necessary to explicitly refute cosmopolitan theories or engage in
debates with democratic or cosmopolitan views, since no debates of this kind can ever be on
equal terms, but at best will only serve as preliminary or educational discussions leading to the
point of view of real insight.
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XVI. Plato confronts us with the tragic choice of either continuing with sophistic, historical, or
rhetorical quarrels, which may please our materialistic inclinations and sophistic prejudices, or
trying to overcome those prejudices by delving into the very foundations of being (agathón).
However, to do this, we have to first accept the leadership of Socrates. Accepting Socrates’
leadership might appear to be a small price to pay, since he never required (qua Platonic
personae) blind obedience but demonstrates what philosophical reversion of life through insight
means.
Yet, the figure of Socrates reveals a systematic weakness in Plato. Plato uses Socrates as an
indispensible intermediary for finding the way through the intricate practice of philosophy, but he
never explains how the man, Socrates, could arise in the first place.118 If everyone needs guidance
from the initiated there needs to be the first initiator, someone who initiated himself or who
gained insight out of himself. So we might ask how the Athenian citizen Socrates could ever
become the philosopher Socrates and why self-recognition should be confined to the case of
Socrates, who then must serve as a 'medium' for everyone else. Perhaps Plato implicitly
acknowledged this problem in his later dialogues, when the younger Socrates or the Athenian
stranger lead the discussion. However, these figures form at least a literary continuum with the
Socrates of the earlier dialogues.
It might be at this juncture that one could challenge Plato's illusion that initiation through
discipleship with Socrates is a necessary condition for practicing philosophy. One could imagine
a dialogue between Socrates and the Athenian stranger, in which the protagonists have different
backgrounds and disagree about some question. This dialogue would have moved toward and
even necessitated a reflection on the self-formation and the relationships between those two.
However, a dialogue of this kind is glaringly missing.119 In Plato the paidèia (philosophical
formation of body and soul) is limited to the teacher-pupil relationship and never happens
between two persons of equal standing who are both philosophers in the best sense. This also has
important political consequences, in Plato's terminology, consequences for the way we conceive
the individual soul or the individual city.
Plato invented philosophy as a giant vortex that readily draws bits and pieces from all sides into
itself. Even though nearly all topics of philosophical discourse are presented dialectically – thus
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in a way that is not just a statement, position or claim but a mini dialogue in its own right – and
even though there is a drift towards the good as an unascertainable center and a corresponding
urge to watch the formation of other souls, there is ultimately a strange disregard of individual
human beings. For the most part they are referred to as sheep, dogs, or puppets that need to be
formed. Similarly, other cities appear as external threats or resources for practical studies but
never as possible philosophical sites in their own right. Thus, one could say that the internal limit
that precludes Plato from developing the idea of a Hellenic commonwealth of independent cities
is a philosophical limit. Plato has expressed philosophy by dramatizing the person of Socrates,
thus demonstrating a particular form of philosophical practice, but he failed to develop the
underlying principle that might allow us to conceptualize the relationship between different
individuals as subjects or between different autonomous cities in a commonwealth.
XVII. I began this essay by suggesting that current liberal convictions that appear to lead
naturally to a cosmopolitan theory or a theory of global justice are not as firmly grounded as one
might think, and that ancient thought might serve as a mirror of the current discourse. The
challenge I want to present in this way – challenge understood as both provocation and trial – is
that the fronts have turned around. The ancient philosophical tradition does not merely represent
a pre-cosmopolitan junior stage, but instead, turns out to be the old trapper of ancient
cosmopolitan sentiments. Since ancient thought is not just history "over and forgotten" but a
constant companion of modern thinking,120 this reflection shows that political philosophy has lost
its innocence and challenges the self evidence of its alliance with the 'noble cause' of
cosmopolitanism. If we want to accept Plato's suggestion that philosophy may show us a way out
of sophistic quarrels by providing us with a foundation and a more dialectical or comprehensive
understanding of ourselves and others, we must also to face up to totalitarian "spell of Plato". We
cannot respond to it by simply reaffirming contemporary liberal convictions121 but only by
tackling the philosophical problems left over by Plato.
Obviously, I have not tried to give answers to contemporary problems, let alone give normative
recommendations about how to build a just world, but merely attempted to explore the
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dimensions of the question of a cosmopolitan order. My aim was not to argue in favor of a
'history of decay of liberalism' or to pinpoint 'the ancients' or 'the true Plato' against 'the moderns'
but to open up a new kind of discourse. I have also not defended Plato's 'metaphysics,' given
directions for a way out of the cage, so to speak, but only illuminated it in a different light so that
a desire to leave it may arise.
Since Plato charms his readers with his lively images it might be necessary to end with a different
one. We think of ourselves that we live in a secular age, in which the bright light of scientific
theories and enlightened philosophy have expelled all the gods, and in which freestanding
political ideas combined with reasonable distinctions between public and private spaces enable us
to live a life that is good if it is lived according to a plan. By casting a different light on our
secular age, I have made a troubling suggestion. The reasonable and perfectly styled distinctions
may end up looking more like the small world in the movie The Truman Show; a golden cage of
polished artificial reality. However there is hope in this picture. The discovery of our true self
(with a little help from eros) might lead us to the edge of our small world and let us poke our
heads out into the beyond.

